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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH and 
MARGARET REEVES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-v-
RAY WILLIS REEVES, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 14511 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants, State of Utah, and Margaret B. Reeves, 
appeal in part from a judgment rendered against the Respondent 
on an order to show cause in re temporary support entered in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah denying Appellant reimbursement for the total sum 
of assistance payments expended for co-plaintiff and awarding 
judgment for child support at the rate of $55.00 per month. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted judgment to the State of Utah 
for child support based on the amount of $55.00 per month less 
payments but held that the State of Utah could not enforce the 
past duty for wife support under the divorce proceedings and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the 
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State of Utah was not entitled to collect support under the 
duty of support laws without a prior court order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
holding that the State of Utah cannot collect wife support 
funds for past support without a prior order of the court, 
the court's ruling that prior wife support could not be included 
under the divorce proceeding, and Appellants seek reversal 
of the court's ruling that support judgments be pro-rated on 
the welfare grant amounts with a request that the matter be 
remanded for the lower court to determine whether the $55.00 
basis is reasonable or whether the defendant was capable of 
paying more for the support of his child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves, following her 
marriage of August 16, 1974, separated from her husband Ray 
W. Reeves on or about the 14th of October, 1974. On December 18, 
1974, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against defendant 
in which she sought a divorce from him. (R.l-2) Because of 
defendant's failure to provide support for his wife and child, 
plaintiff was forced to rely on public assistance payments from 
January, 1975 through January, 1976. (R.17-18) On June 20, 
1975, a child was born to plaintiff. An assignment of 
collection was executed on July 15, 1975 pursuant to Utah Code 
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Annotated §78-45-9 by which plaintiff's rights to support 
were subrogated to those of the Department of Social Services. 
(R.12) Defendant was notified in August, 1975, that plaintiff 
was receiving public assistance. Other than a token payment 
of $37.50 in September, 1975, paid to the Department of 
Social Services (R.17), defendant at no time made any attempt 
to discharge his financial obligations to his wife or child 
as far as the record involved shows. 
A hearing was held on February 20, 1976, on the 
Utah State Department of Social Services' order to show cause 
in re temporary support and motion for a judgment against the 
defendant. Under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9, as amended, 
granting the State derivative rights to seek reimbursement 
from obligors, the State requested judgment for the total 
sum of $2,418.00 given to support defendant's wife and child. 
(R.19) The lower court granted judgment against defendant 
in favor of the Utah State Department of Social Services for 
the sum of $457.50 for unpaid child support and based its 
finding on the amount of $55.00 per month or the difference 
between a welfare grant of one person and two persons (R.16) 
and denied the State judgment for assistance payments given 
defendant's wife without prior order of the court. Based upon 
stipulation of all counsel a prospective temporary child 
support order was entered for $50.00 per month based on defendant's 
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present circumstances (R.22). 
Appellants appeal in part the order of the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A HUSBAND'S DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE 
MAY BE PURSUED UNDER DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
This present action, of which the State of Utah is 
involved because of welfare payments, involves a situation 
where the entire period of separation outside of a few days 
has taken place after the filing of a verified complaint for 
divorce. After the complaint was filed, the co-plaintiff 
below applied for and began receiving public assistance. 
Based on the fact that neither party appeared to 
be moving forward in the action and that no temporary order 
of either wife or child support was established, the State of 
Utah joined as a party (R.13) to enforce the statutory duty 
of Utah Code Annotated §78-4 5-3 for both the wife and child. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of State of Utah and Margo 
Bartholomew v. Bartholomew P.2d (filed March 22, 
19 76) held that the State of Utah was a proper party in interest 
based on the fact that support was being rendered and was 
therefore a proper party to divorce proceedings. 
Neither Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3, nor Bartholomew, 
id., require separate actions to enforce support duties. As 
in this case, juridisction over the parties became firm upon 
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service of the summons and complaint on the defendant (R.7). 
As such, the entire support reimbursement asked for in the 
action below, except for the month of January, 1975, was for 
a period of time after the divorce proceedings commenced. 
It is the position of Appellants that once the 
complaint for divorce is filed and served, that the court 
has authority not only to enter a temporary support order 
under the divorce laws, and divorce proceedings, but can also 
enter a judgment for accrued and unpaid child support arrearages 
based on the statutory language cited above under the same 
divorce proceedings. The lower court refused to grant such 
a judgment and indicated in lanugage in open court that the 
State would have to file a separate action (T.18), while in 
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.25), 
the court states that the defendant has no duty to reimburse 
the State of Utah for money expended for the woman without a 
prior court order. Under which action the duty is enforced 
seems irrevelant to the more important position that the duty 
to support is enforced. It appears to Appellants that if 
pursuing under the divorce action would simplify and "clean 
up" the entire process, that method should be pursued. 
The duty exists by law, and it appears to be more 
sensible, economical, judicial, to have all support matters 
under one action where possible. The Appellants therefore 
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ask this court to permit enforcement of this statutory duty 
under the divorce proceedings. 
POINT II 
A HUSBAND IN THE STATE OF UTAH HAS A 
DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE BOTH BY 
STATUTE AND COMMON LAW 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3 states: "Every man 
shall support his wife and child." This language seems clear 
enough, but the lower court seems to have added the following 
language: "Every man shall support his wife and child when 
the court says so," The statute as it presently appears is 
not a conditional statute but is a positive command and state-
ment of legislative intent. If at any time the "husband" does 
not support his "family" he is in contravention to this 
statutory requirement. If the legislature wanted to make this 
duty conditional on a court order, it seems only apparent that 
it would have said so. The lower court is not given the 
prerogative to do away with this obligation simply under the 
guise that no judicial determination has been made for the 
period claimed. 
This statutory duty has been summarized in 41 Am 
Jur 2d §356 as follows: 
"If a husband is guilty of misconduct 
which results ina.Spouse!s separating, and 
the wife has no adequate provision for 
her support, the husband is liable for 
necessaries others have furnished to her. 
The husband is guilty of such misconduct 
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where he has deserted his wife, turned 
her away, or treated her with such 
cruelty that she has been compelled to 
leave him." 
This court has recognized the duty and responsibility 
to support wives and families long before the statute quoted 
above was enacted (1957). In the case of Snow v. Snow 13 Utah 
15, 43 P.620 (1896), this court said: 
"Any man attaining his majority, who 
voluntarily enters into the marital 
relation, should be willing to assume 
those ordinary and responsible obligations 
of a husband which naturally follow and 
attend such relation. These duties of the 
husband require hin to provide the wife and 
children with a reasonable maintenance 
during the continuance of that relation; 
and, in case of separation and divorce 
occasioned by his own fault, he should 
not complain that the duties so assumed 
should remain a continuing obligation 
upon his part." (Emphasis a^ dded) 
In the recent case of Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 
141 (1974) the Supreme Court of Utah held that a third party's 
right to reimbursement for support supplied to a child from 
the failure of the parent to furnish support, belongs to whoever 
furnishes the support. The court said: 
"... suppose a father (parent) fails over 
a period of time to furnish support of the 
child, and the mother, or someone else, 
furnishes it. That person then has the 
right to claim reimbursement from the parent, 
the same as any other past debt. This 
right of reimbursement belongs to whoever 
furnished the support; and it is subject 
to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction 
or discharge in the same manner as any 
other debt." (Emphasis added) at P. 143. 
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Here, though wife support is the point at issue, Appellants 
point out to the court that the statutory duty upon which this 
appeal is based states specifically: 
"Every man shall support his wife 
and child." 
It appears consistent with the above case to say: 
...Suppose a husband fails over a 
period of time to furnish support of 
his wife, and someone else furnishes 
it. That person has the right to claim 
reimbursement from the husband, the same 
as any other past debt... 
No distinction can be seen between the support of the wife or 
child when under the statute both may expect that support. Until 
a divorce decree is entered or the marriage is annuled, there 
exists this right of a third party to collect current support 
and to collect back amounts already expended. 
This right of a private party to hold a husband 
liable for necessaries furnished a wife has not only been long 
established, but has been extended to public authorities. 
Howard v. Whetstone Township, 10 Ohio 365 (1841); Hannover v. 
Turner, 14 Mass. 227 (1817). For example, where a woman becomes 
a public charge, the money required for. her support can be 
recovered from the husband by suit of the party who had made 
the advances. More recently Sellman v. Sellman, 185 P.2d 
846 (1947) : "The husband assumes responsibility for the 
support of his family and upon his failure to provide such 
support his wife is authorized to purchase on his credit 
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whatever is necessary for her maintenance.11 
Though counsel for respondent attached some importance 
to the pendency of divorce and plaintiff's waiver of alimony, 
the fact that a husband and wife have marital difficulties . 
"...or that one of them has filed an action for divorce does 
not change the marital relationship. The parties remain 
husband and wife until a divorce decree is granted." Fisher 
v. Taler, 401 P.2d 1012, 194 Kan 701 (19651). 
In an early Georgia case, Mitchel v. Treanor 11 Ga. 
326 (1852) the court held that a decree of divorce subsequent 
to a period of separation had no effect or^  the previously 
accrued liability of a husband for necessaries furnished to 
his wife by a third party. The court said the husband was not: 
"...relieved from liability by the 
subsequent provision made by the court 
and jury for past alimony, the goods 
having been previously delivered." 
The Montana Supreme Court in Murphy v. Murphy 134 
Mont. 594, 335 P.2d 296 (1959) discussed the permanence and 
importance of this duty of "wife-support" when a sufficient 
showing of need for support was made. The court stated: 
"...regardless of any prior statements 
of claim of self-sufficiency of the wife, 
this could not operate as a perpetual 
release of the husband of the duty and 
responsibility under the law to care for 
his wife and family..." 
Certainly, the fact that a womari ana/or children are 
on public assistance gives rise to a rebuttable presumption 
that a woman is in need. 
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Thus, the duty of the husband to support his wife 
is not only "real", but the State of Utah is entitled to 
enforce that duty against a husband in absence of prior court 
order until the decree of divorce is final if seiid "wife" is 
drawing public assistance for her support. Though husband 
and wife might no longer be compatible, or desertion, or cruelty 
has taken place, such does not obviate the husband's obligation 
to furnish support when no divorce has been granted. 
Since the entire time the wife was receiving public 
assistance is covered after the divorce complaint was filed, 
the State should be able to enforce this duty under the divorce 
number instead of suing separately. Such is only feasible since 
the numbers of actions are limited as well as having all 
matters pertaining to the divorce and separation under one 
case. 
The duty not only exists, but the State of Utah is 
entitled to enforce that duty under the divorce action. 
POINT III 
A HUSBAND'S DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE 
IS ENFORCEABLE INDEPENDENT OF ANY 
COURT ORDER. 
The statutory duty and obligation disucssed under 
Point II, above, negates any necessity for again establishing 
a duty of support by court order before that duty can be 
enforced. As defined in Utah Code Annotated §77-61a-2(f): 
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11
 'Duty of support1 includes any duty of 
support imposed or imposable by law, or 
by any court order, decree, or judgment, 
whether interlocutory or final, whether 
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, 
legal separation, separate maintenance 
or otherwise." (Emphasis added) 
The duty of support, being enforceable either by 
law or by court order, cannot, therefore, be made contingent 
upon an order of the court. In the court below, there was 
confusion as to this very point. In Point 5 of its "Conclusions 
of Law", the court stated that "the defendant has no duty to 
reimburse the Utah State Department of Social Services for 
public assistance paid to the plaintiff fc(r and on behalf of 
the plaintiff without a prior order of thq court." Appellants 
claim this is contrary to the statutory provision cited 
immediately before which says that the dui^ y can be enforced 
by law (meaning suit for back funds already expended) or by 
court order (meaning orders already established to govern the 
conduct of the parties). The court on pa^e 18 of the transcript 
of the hearing said that the State could come in under a separate 
action for prior support. Appellants cannot see how counsel 
for defendant, or the court itself, could prepare and sign 
Conclusions of Law different than what the court actually said. 
It should further be pointed out that though reimbursement 
was denied for past payments given to the wife because of the 
lack of a court order, it should be noted that despite the lack 
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of a prior court order, a judgment on back support was awarded 
in behalf of the child. This shows the confusion of the lower 
court. Under one portion of the statute imposing a duty of 
support the court grants judgment without a prior court order 
and turns around and denies the same relief for a wife under 
the other half of the statute. 
That the Department of Social Services has the right 
to so intervene is established by Bartholomew, supra, as well 
as Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9. 
Section 9 makes no direct mention of a support order , 
because the purpose of 78-45-3, supra, is to establish an 
enforceable statutory duty of support. This then obviates 
the necessity of going to court to get an order before an 
obligee is able to enforce a right of support in Utah either 
for current or past amounts due. 
This rationale is supported by Commissioners1 
statements about the purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, of which 78-45-3 and 9 are part; and also by 
William Brockelbank in his now famous treatise, Interstate 
Enforcement of Family Support, 2nd Edition. In the Commissioners1 
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
they enunciate as a basic purpose of the act the establishment 
of a statutory duty of support to be used in conjunction 
with URESA. (U.C.A. Matr., Fam. and Health Laws 133). The 
famous act was passed to eliminate confusion among lawyers 
-13-
who believed URESA was unenforceable without a court order 
declaring a duty of support. Commenting on this Brockelbank 
said: 
".../I/t is suprising to find /such/ 
misconceptions. One such is that only 
orders of support of one state will be 
enforced in another under the Act. In 
fact it is 'all duties', and the dutyf 
of course, may grow out of the order of 
support or a judgment or decree but is 
equally a duty if it never has received 
judicial attention and now is the basis 
of litigation for the first time under 
the Act." (Emphasis added) 
Brockelbank and Infansto, Interstate Enforcement of 
Family Support, 2nd ed. , 1971, p. 39. Thes|e "all duties" spoken 
of by Brockelbank encompases not only courtt orders of support, 
but statutory (such as 78-45-3) and commoq law duties of support 
as well. 
Thus, Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3 establishing a 
statutory right of support for both children and wives and 
§78-45-9 Utah Code Annotated (1957) gives the obligee the right 
to enforce this duty of support. Read together, there is no 
need to establish again by court order a duty of support before 
such duty can be enforced, but solely to determine the amount 
owed, if the husband has not fulfilled his duty. 
California, with a support statute similar to Utah's 
law, in Los Angeles County v. Frisbie 122 P.2d 526, 19 Cal 
634 (1942): 
"As so employed, these worfds, referable 
to the recoupment of sums already paid, 
indicate the legislature's intention 
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by this enactment to provide an ordinary 
cause of action for the recovery of 
money and negative the requirement of 
a judicial decree to determine the 
measure of the debt as the maintenance 
of such action,lf (Emphasis added) 
The language of the court is too clear to be mistaken: 
when the support obligation is established by statute, there 
is no need to go into court and get a court order prior to 
an action for reimbursement based on the statute. The burden 
must be on the defendant-husband to show that the amount 
claimed for reimbursement is unreasonable. Hence, there is 
a hearing on liability either pre or post decree to determine 
liability. Such is not determined by arbitrary methods to 
"drain" the pockets of delinquent husbands/fathers. 
The duty of wife support is constant whereas the 
liability is variable - being dependent on circumstances. As 
an example of the inequity of the lower court's position 
Appellants submit the following hypothetical: 
Two sets of parents with the same 
number of children separate at the same 
time. One husband earns $5,000.00 a 
year and is ordered under a separation 
agreement to pay $100.00 per month 
support for wife and children. The 
second husband earns $20,000.00 a 
year but that couple obtains no court 
ordered support arrangement. Both 
couples remain separated for one year 
before a divorce is decreed. 
For this court to say that the man earning $5,000.00 
must support his family solely becuase of the court order 
and then say that the man earning four times as rauch need not 
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support his family or reimburse what has been expended solely 
because there is no court order is totally inconsistent. If 
such a position be upheld, it is invidious discrimination 
against any one with enough sense to get legal counsel to 
protect his interests. In essence, the lower court is saying: 
"If you can hide from the clutches of the court, there is 
no duty." 
The lower court said: 
".•.I don't think that the State Welfare 
Department can simply start paying her 
welfare and say, 'Even though a court 
hasn't decided what the duty of support 
is and even though there is no court 
order with respect to this, this is 
what the court must make him pay.'" 
(T.ll) (Emphasis added) 
The State never claimed that the court must grant 
judgment for the amount of money expended by welfare, but did 
say that the burden is on the defendant to show that the amount 
claimed due and owing for reimbursement is inappropriate and 
unjustified under the circumstances. In essence, if the 
defendant only earns $200.00 net per month, and welfare 
expends $300.00 per month for his dependents, it would seem 
unreasonable to grant judgment for the $300.00. The order to 
show cause before the court was an order for the defendant to 
show cause why judgment for the amount cl|aimed is not appropriate• 
All this would entale is taking testimony and making a record 
as to the husband's ability to support during the period of 
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time claimed. The court then determines what the "reasonable" 
support arrearage should be Eor that period of time. Appellants 
point out the criteria listed under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7 
whereby such a determination is made. In the instant case, 
the lower court not only says the defendant has no burden to 
show the amount claimed is unreasonable, but that there is 
no enforceable duty. This is gross error. A wife has a right 
to support. When a woman go€>s on public assistance, the 
enforcement of that right to support shifts to the State of Utah 
under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9 and other provisions of 
§78-45b-l et.seq. as incorporated into Title 78-45. If the man 
can forgo that right by simply not paying, or not allowing 
a court to establish an order of support by refraining from 
being served with process, this entire area of the law is 
twisted out of proportions and in essence makes the law a 
nullity. 
This court said in Kimball v. Grantsville 19 Utah 
368 (1899): 
Independently of any repugnance 
between statute and any constitutional 
provision, court has no power to 
arrest statute's execution however 
unwise or unjust, in opinion of court, 
statute may be, or whatever motives 
may have led to its enactment. 
In the instant case, the lower court is not only arresting 
the execution of the statute, but in essence does away with it -
in mocking gesture - until jurisdiction is obtained over the 
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person of the husband. For example, if a husband/father 
removes himself from the confines of this state and travels 
to another, or cannot be found to be served, there is no way 
to get personal jurisdiction over him to establish an order 
of support. Such is an inducement to anyone with sense at 
all to hide out - to forgo being responsible for support. 
The legislature intended the duty of wife support 
to be established without question. To reiterate this 
importance, which is incorporated into Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45-1 et. seg., the Utah legislature enacted Utah Code 
Annotated §7 8-45b-2 which provides: 
"Every obligor shall be deemed to 
have received notice of the rights 
of the department by his failure to 
provide and the obligee's receipt 
of support." 
Thus, the legislature assumes, and makes its intent 
clear that from day one of separation, the husband (if the 
obligor) is on notice that he has to support his dependents 
and if the Department of Social Services gives out aid, the 
obligor owes the support to the State for reimbursement. 
Appellants feel the law is clear enough. 
The court further infers in its statements on the 
record that the Department of Social Services is telling the 
court what has to be reimbursed, ie. what was expended by 
welfare. As explained under Point IV of the argument, the 
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legilature has established a "minimum household needs budget". 
Thus, there is a presumption in the law that that amount is 
a reasonable amount for necessary support. Such an amount is 
not arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously, but by intense 
study. The court has the authority and power to review that 
presumption by the rebuttle of the delinquent parent/husband. 
If it appears to the court that the amount claimed is reasonable 
under the circumstances, the legislative intent and findings 
should be honored. In this instant case, the court didn't 
even attempt to search out the circumstances and thus erred 
in its procedure. 
As the problems of desertion and divorce multiply, 
it becomes increasingly important that everything possible be 
done to encourage the proper discharge of marital and parental 
duties. With the desertion or nonsupport of the male bread-
winner, the State generally has no choice but that of rendering 
assistance. This assistance imposes a burden upon the citizenry 
and the welfare agencies - it is only fair that the individual 
responsible for bringing misery and misfortune to their 
families be held financially liable therefore. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT DUE AND 
OWING FOR THE CHILD OF THE PARTIES 
WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
GRANT FOR ONE AND THE GRANT 
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FOR TWO PEOPLE WITHOUT SOME 
FACTUAL SUBSTANTIATION THAT SAID 
AMOUNT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Perhaps the statement of the trial court as found 
in the transcript of the hearing at page 16 deliniates the 
controversy here presented: 
"The Court:...and I don't agree that 
when they increase it from $144 to $199 
because she has a child, then the 
obligation of the child support is one-
half of the $199 instead of the additional 
amount.,f 
In essence, the court arbitrarily held that the child support 
claimed could not exceed the difference between the grant for 
one person ($144) and the grant for two (£199). With this, 
.Appellants take issue. 
The intent of the legislature is expressed in 
tJ.C.A. 55-15a-18. The language refers tp grants to "assistance 
households". By reference to "assistance households", the 
legislation makes clear that the needs of the family as a 
w hole are to be examined as opposed to those of individual 
members. While it is true that assistance is awarded on a 
prorated basis according to the number of individuals within 
a family, this is but a means of complying with strict budgetary 
requirements in insuring that a "family unit" has a grant 
conducive to the needs of all members of the unit. 
The aforementioned Utah Code Section clearly sets forth 
the constraints under which assistance is granted: 
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"Assistance grants for or in behalf 
of any one household in any one month 
shall be determined as follows: 
(l)The office shall develop a 
standard budget which reflects the 
minimum needs of assistance households. 
The standard budget shall be adjusted 
annually to reflect changes upward 
or downward in the costs of living and 
filed with the governor and with the 
legislative appropriations committee 
annually. The standard budget is the 
basis for determination of monthly 
assistance grants to recipient house-
holds for each fiscal year the legis-
lature appropriates funds." (Emphasis 
added) 
This amount for "households" is established by the Utah 
legislature as part of its budget. That budget is based on 
grants for the size of "units" which in turn is based on the 
number within the unit. The legislative enactment of the 
present "needs budget" is found in the Laws of Utah, 1975/ 
Chapter 216, Item 159, page 1069: 
"a. That Public Assistance grants for 
fiscal year 1976 be set at a level not 
to exceet 77 percent of the Summer 1974 
Needs Budget." 
Thus, the Department of Social Services is to look 
to the whole family in making its determination of need. By 
focusing on the family, the legislature has recognized the 
essential equality of each family member. In effect, what the 
lower court has done is to make a value judgment as to the 
worth of the child as compared to the mother. It is arbitrary 
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and discriminatory to hold that one member is worth $144.00, 
the second worh $55.00, and the third stil|l less because of 
proportioning. Though pro-rated, all membqrs are none-the-less 
equal - the total assistance rendered is c^ iven for the use 
of all family members. The lower court's holding thus removes 
emphasis from the family and discriminates as to amounts to 
be given each individual. 
Since welfare payments provide for "minimum needs" 
only, the amount ordered to be paid by th£ court seems all the 
more unreasonable. Welfare payments, as contrasted to child 
support payments, are frequently the only means of support available 
to a family. To further reduce this amount that family members 
could receive, might well result in payments which fall below 
the "minimum needs" standard. When determining the needs of 
children, as in the instant case, the policy of the law is not 
that of taking as much away from them as possible, but to render 
all assistance which the law allows. 
The pro-rated "Needs Budget" is based on the 
presumption that no matter how large the family, there are 
certain "necessary expenses" such as rent, lights, gas, etc., 
which are needed for one person as well as 10 people. The 
per person expense on such costs is generally less as the 
family gets larger, bringing about less need for money to 
provide a minimum standard as purported by the statute 
previously cited. 
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There is no evidence in the record, or transcript 
of the hearing that anything was presented to the court to 
affirm its position that the amount of support for the child 
was $55.00. Appellants claim that for a grant $199.00, both 
the mother and child benefited equally raising the presumption 
that he owes $99.50 or one half of the grant amount. The 
fact that a current child support order was stipulated to in 
the amount of $50.00 is irrevelant to the question here'raised 
as to whether the defendant-respondent was capable during the 
pre hearing period of paying one-half of the grant amount 
which is the child's share of the "household's needs'1. In 
fact there might be circumstances where a child receives much 
more benefit than the mother. Who is to say that the mother 
is the first person on the grant and the child is second. If 
there are two children on the grant with the mother not receiving 
aid, does that mean the one child is worth $144.00 and the 
other child is only worth $55.00. The Appellants say no. 
Because minimum needs only are allowed for, there 
should be no reduction of the sums provided for destitute 
children unless a close examination of the circumstances 
clearly shows that the full amount available was not necessary. 
The lower court erred in determining the amount owed for the 
child. This case should therefore be remanded for a hearing 
to determine whether the respondent-father was capable of 
paying more - up to one-half the welfare grant - for the child*s 
support during the separation period. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both the law and reason prescribe Appellant's 
position that prior court orders are not needed before the 
duty of "wife-support" is enforceable. further, the lower 
court's position to pro-rate the worth of family members is 
inappropriate when the welfare of family units is concerned. 
Therefore, Appellants urge thi$ court to sustain 
Appellant's position and remand this cas^ to the lower 
court for enforcement and judgment for monies owed the wife 
under the divorce proceedings, and to review the ability 
of the defendant-respondent to reimburse for child support. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant attorney General 
-24-
